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Abstract
In many practical situations, we need to make a decision. In engineering, we need to decide
on the best design of a system, and, for existing systems – on the best control strategy.
In financial applications, we need to decide what is the best way to invest money. In
geosciences, we need to decide whether we should explore a possible mineral deposit – or
whether we should perform more experiments and measurements (and what exactly).
In some cases, we can compute the exact consequences of each decision – e.g., if we
are controlling a satellite. However, in many other cases, we do not know the exact consequences. In such situations, we need to make a decision under uncertainty.
In many application areas, uncertainty is small – and can be made even smaller by
appropriate measurements. For example, when we control a self-driving car, if there is an
uncertainty about the locations and speeds of other objects on the road, we can install
more accurate sensors and get a better description of the driving environment.
However, there are applications when it is difficult or even impossible to decrease uncertainty. One such area is anything related to human activities. Humans make individual
decisions based on their perceived value of different alternatives. The same alternative –
be it a movie or a computer – have drastically different value to different people, so it is
very difficult to predict their behavior. Such behavior affects economics and finance, so
in decision making in economics and finance, it is very important to take such decision
making under uncertainty into account.
Another area where it is difficult to decrease uncertainty is geosciences. In this thesis,
we analyze the general problem of decision making under uncertainty and show how our
results can be applied to finances and geosciences.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Need for decision making. In many practical situations, we need to make a decision.
• In engineering, we need to decide on the best design of a system, and, for existing
systems – on the best control strategy.
• In financial applications, we need to decide what is the best way to invest money.
• In geosciences, we need to decide whether we should explore a possible mineral deposit
– or whether we should perform more experiments and measurements (and what
exactly).
Need for decision making under uncertainty. In some cases, we can compute the
exact consequences of each decision – e.g., if we are controlling a satellite. However, in
many other cases, we do not know the exact consequences. In such situations, we need to
make a decision under uncertainty.
Possible application areas. In many application areas, uncertainty is small – and can
be made even smaller by appropriate measurements. For example, when we control a selfdriving car, if there is an uncertainty about the locations and speeds of other objects on
the road, we can install more accurate sensors and get a better description of the driving
environment.
However, there are applications when it is difficult or even impossible to decrease uncertainty. One such area is anything related to human activities. Humans make individual
decisions based on their perceived value of different alternatives. The same alternative –
be it a movie or a computer – have drastically different value to different people, so it is
1

very difficult to predict their behavior. Such behavior affects economics and finance, so
in decision making in economics and finance, it is very important to take such decision
making under uncertainty into account.
Another area where it is difficult to decrease uncertainty is geosciences. In the cases of
self-driving cars, we can decrease uncertainty by installing more accurate sensors, but to
make a decision, e.g., on whether a certain underground area contains oil, there is only so
much we can do with measurements. The only way to get a more accurate picture of what
is going on beneath the earth surface is to dig a well and see – and the whole purpose of
decision making is to decide whether such an expensive procedure is worth doing.
What we do in this thesis. In line with the above, in this thesis, we first, describe
what is currently known about decision making under uncertainty. This will be discussed
in Chapter 2.
In general, decision making under uncertainty requires that we fix some objective function that reflects the decision maker’s interests. It is often difficult to find the expression
that exactly captures these interests. In such cases, we have an approximate objective
functions. It is well known that the quality of the resulting decisions and the computational complexity of computing this decision depend on the choice of approximating family.
In Chapter 3, we formulate the problem of selecting an optimal approximating family as
a precise mathematical problem, and we show that, under reasonable assumptions, the
optimal approximating functions are polynomials.
Usually, decision makers do not just want to have a solution to their current problems,
they also want to learn general techniques that will help them solve future problems. In
particular, since it makes sense to consider polynomial objective functions, it is important to
teach decision makers how to analyze such functions. A new way of doing this is presented
in Chapter 4.
From the purely mathematical viewpoint, it is sufficient to formulate the practical problem in precise mathematical terms. However, from the practical viewpoint, even after this
formulation, we still need to solve the corresponding computational problem. For simple
2

problems, the existing algorithms provide solutions in reasonable time. However, for more
complex problems, the existing algorithms take too long a time. It is therefore necessary to
explore the possibility of faster computations. One such possibility is the use of quantum
computing. There are many existing algorithms for quantum computing, but, as we show
in Chapter 5, they often do not provide an adequate representation of generic functions –
and objective functions corresponding to decision making under uncertainty can be very
complex. In this section, we show how to come up with more adequate representation of
generic functions in quantum computing.
The practical usefulness of these theoretical developments is illustrated on the two above
application examples: finances and geosciences.
We start with applications to finances. Of course, in finances, decision theory is already
heavily used. What we are trying to do is illustrate the effectiveness of decision-makingunder-uncertainty techniques in situations which are not well described by the usual decision theory approaches. Specifically, in Chapter 6, we explain why people sell and buy in
the first place – it turns out that, from the usual economical viewpoint, it is still largely
a mystery. In Chapter 7, we explain why for the same person, buy and sell prices are
often different – another phenomenon that puzzles economists. These chapters describe
the current decision making. If we take into account events in the past – or possible future
consequences – then we need to describe how people perceive the corresponding time intervals. In Chapter 8, we explain that the seemingly counterintuitive empirical data about the
human perception of time intervals can be naturally explained by the usual results about
decision making under uncertainty.
Chapter 9 contains applications to geosciences. To illustrate the power of decision
making techniques, we selected one of the most mysterious and challenging phenomenon –
the Bhutan landscape anomaly.
Finally, in Chapter 10, we provide our future work plans.
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Chapter 2
Decision Theory: A Brief Reminder
What is traditional decision theory. Traditional decision theory (see, e.g., [13, 22, 25,
30, 36]) describes preferences of rational agents, i.e., e.g., agents that when preferring A to
B and B to C would always prefer A to C.
Comment. It is well known that real agents are not perfectly rational (see, e.g., [20, 24]),
for the simple reason that our ability to process information and select an optimal decision
is bounded. However, in many cases, traditional decision theory still provides a very good
picture of human behavior.
The notion of utility. To describe the preferences of such an agent, we can select two
alternatives:
• a very bad one A− that is much worse than this agent will actually encounter, and
• a very good one A+ that is much better than this agent will actually encounter.
For each value p from the interval [0, 1], we can form a lottery L(p) in which we get A+
with probability p and A− with the remaining probability 1 − p.
When p is close to 1, this means that we are almost certainly getting a very good deal.
So, for any realistic option A, the corresponding lottery L(p) is better than A: A < L(p).
Similarly, when p is close to 0, this means that we are almost certainly getting a very
bad deal, so L(p) < A. There should be a threshold u at which the preference L(p) < A
corresponding to smaller probabilities p is replaced by an opposite preference A < L(p). In
other words, we should have:
• L(p) < A for all p < u and
4

• A < L(p) for all p > u.
This threshold value is called the utility of the alternative A; it is denoted by u(A).
The above two conditions means that, in a certain reasonable sense, the original alternative A is equivalent to the lottery L(u(A)) corresponding to the probability u(A):
A ≡ L(u(A)).
A rational agent should maximize utility. Of course, the larger the probability of
getting a very good outcome A+ , the better. Thus, among several lotteries L(p), we should
select the one for which the probability p of getting A+ is the largest. Since each alternative
A is equivalent to the corresponding lottery L(u(A)), this implies that we should select the
alternative with the largest possible value of utility.
Main conclusion of traditional decision theory: a rational agent must maximize
expected utility. In practice, we rarely know the consequences of each action. At best,
we know possible outcomes A1 , . . . , An , and their probabilities p1 , . . . , pn . Since each
alternative Ai is equivalent to a lottery L(u(Ai )) in which we get A+ with probability
u(Ai ) and A− with the remaining probability 1 − u(Ai ), the whole action is equivalent to
a two-stage lottery in which:
• first, we select one of the n alternatives Ai with probability pi , and
• then, depending on which alternative Ai we selected on the first stage, we select A+
with probability u(Ai ) and A− with the remaining probability 1 − u(Ai ).
As a result of this two-stage lottery, we get either A+ or A− . The probability u of getting
A+ can be computed by using the formula of complete probability, it is equal to
u = p1 · u(A1 ) + . . . + pn · u(An ).
This is exactly the formula for the expected value of the utility u(Ai ). Thus, the utility of
each action to a person is equal to the expected value of utility.

5

Thus, according to the traditional decision theory, rational agents should select the
alternative with the largest possible value of expected utility.
Utility is defined modulo linear transformations. The numerical value of utility
depends on the selection of the alternatives A− and A+ . It can be shown that if we select a
different pair (A0− , A0+ ), then the corresponding utility u0 (A) is related to the original utility
by a linear transformation u0 (A) = a · u(A) + b for some a > 0 and b; see, e.g., [22, 30].
How utility is related to money. The dependence of utility of money is non-linear:
√
namely, utility u is proportional to the square root of the amount m of money u = c · m;
see [20] and references therein.
Comment. This empirical fact can be explained. For example, the non-linear character
of this dependence is explained, on a commonsense level, in [21], while the square root
formula can also be explained – but it requires more mathematical analysis; see, e.g., [24].
In the current thesis, we simply take this fact as a given.
How to compare current and future gains: discounting. How can we compare
current and future gains? If we have an amount m of money now, then we can place it in
def

a bank and get the same amount plus interest, i.e., get the new amount m0 = (1 + i) · m
in a year, where i is the interest rate. Thus, the amount m0 in a year is equivalent to the
def

value m = q · m0 now, where q = 1/(1 + i). This reduction of future gains – to make them
comparable to current gains – is known as discounting.
Discounting: a more detailed description. An event – e.g., a good dinner – a year in
the past does not feel as pleasant to a person now as it may have felt a year ago. Similarly,
a not-so-pleasant event in the past – e.g., a painful inoculation – does not feel as bad now
if it felt a year ago, when it actually happened. Thus, the utility of an event changes with
time: positive utility decreases, negative utility increases (i.e., gets closer to 0). If u is the
utility of a current event, how can we describe the utility f (u) of remembering the same
event that happened 1 year ago?
We can normalize the utility values by assuming that the status quo situation has utility
6

0. Then the only remaining transformation is re-scaling u0 = a · u. Similarly to the case
of interval uncertainty, it is reasonable to require that the function f (u) is invariant with
respect to such a transformation, i.e., that:
• if we have v = f (u),
• then for each a, we should have v 0 = f (u0 ), where we denoted v 0 = a · v and u0 = a · u.
Substituting the expressions for v 0 and u0 into the formula v 0 = f (u0 ), we conclude that
a · v = f (a · u), i.e., a · f (u) = f (a · u). Substituting u = 1 into this formula, we conclude
def

that f (a) = q · a, where we denoted q = f (1). Since f (u) < u for u > 0, this would imply
that q < 1.
So, an event with then-utility u that occurred 1 year ago has the utility q · u now.
Similarly, an event with utility u that happened 2 years ago is equivalent to q · u a year
ago, and thus, is equivalent to q · (q · u) = q 2 · u now. We can similarly conclude that an
event with utility u that occurred t moments in the past is equivalent to utility q t · u now.
Decision making under interval uncertainty. In real life, we rarely know the exact
consequences of each action. As a result, for each alternative A, instead of the exact value
of its utility, we often only know the bounds u(A) and u(A) on this unknown value. In
other words, all we know is the interval [u(A), u(A)] that contains the actual (unknown)
value u(A). How can we make a decision under this interval uncertainty?
In particular, for such an interval case, we need to be able to compare the intervalvalued alternative with lotteries L(p) for different values p. As a result of such comparison,
we will come up with a utility of this interval. So, to make recommendations on decision
under interval uncertainty, we need to be able to assign, to each interval [u, u], a single
utility value u(u, u) from this interval that describes this interval’s utility.
Since utility is defined modulo a linear transformation u → u0 = a·u+b, it is reasonable
to require that the corresponding function u(u, u) should also be invariant under such
transformations, i.e., that:

7

• if u = u(u, u),
• then u0 = u(u0 , u0 ), where we denoted u0 = a · u + b, u0 = a · u + b, and u0 = a · u + b.
It turns out that this invariance requirement implies that
u(u, u) = αH · u + (1 − αH ) · u
for some αH ∈ [0, 1] [22, 30]. This formula was first proposed by a future Nobelist Leo
Hurwicz and is, thus, known as the Hurwicz optimism-pessimism criterion [17, 25].
Theoretically, we can have values αH = 0 and αH = 1. However, in practice, such values
do not happen:
• αH = 1 would correspond to a person who only takes into account the best possible
outcome, completely ignoring the risk of possible worse situations;
• similarly, the value αH = 0 would correspond to a person who only takes into account
the worst possible outcome, completely ignoring the possibility of better outcomes.
In real life, we thus always have 0 < αH < 1.

8

Chapter 3
What Is the Optimal Approximating
Family
Results from this chapter will appear in [32].
Need for approximations. In many practical situations, we need to find a good description of the observed data. In a computer, we can only store finitely many parameters.
So, it is reasonable to consider finite-parametric approximation families, i.e., families that
depend on finitely many parameters C1 , . . . , Cn .
Need to consider families that linearly depend on the parameters. From the
computational viewpoint, the easiest case is when the dependence on the parameters is
linear, i.e., when the family has the form
f (x) = C1 · f1 (x) + . . . + Cn · fn (x)
for some functions f1 (x), . . . , fn (x). In this case, to find the values of the parameters Ci
(k)

(k)

based on the known observations x1 , . . . , xn , y (k) , it is sufficient to solve a system of linear
equations
y (k) = C1 · f1 (x(k) ) + . . . + Cn · fn (x(k) ).
For solving systems of linear equations, there are efficient algorithms.
In principle, we can consider more complex dependencies – e.g., quadratic ones:
X
X
f (x) =
Ci · fi (x) +
Ci · Cj · fij (x).
i

i,j

However, in this case, to find the values of the corresponding parameters, we would need
to solve systems of quadratic equations – and this is known to be NP-hard; see, e.g., [35].
9

Thus, unless P=NP (which most computer scientists believe to be impossible), no general
feasible algorithm is possible for solving such systems.
Since we want to have efficient algorithms, it is reasonable to restrict ourselves to
approximating families in which the dependence on the parameters is linear.
Observations are usually smooth. Sensors usually smooth the observed processes,
so what we observe is usually smooth. So, we can safely assume that the corresponding
functions fi (x) are smooth (differentiable).
Thus, we arrive at the following definition.
Definition 3.1. Let n be a positive integer. By an approximating family, we mean a
family of functions
{C1 · f1 (x) + . . . + Cn · fn (x)}C1 ,...,Cn ,

(3.1)

where the functions f1 (x), . . . , fn (x) are fixed differentiable functions, and C1 , . . . , Cn are
arbitrary real numbers.
From this viewpoint, selecting a description means selecting n functions f1 (x), . . . ,
fn (x).
Towards the optimal description. Which description is the best? To answer this
question, we need to be able to decide, for each two families of functions F and F 0 , whether
the first family is better (we will denote it by F 0 < F ) or the second family is better
(F < F 0 ), or both families have the same quality (we will denote it by F ∼ F 0 ). Clearly,
if F is worse than F 0 and F 0 is worse than F 00 , then F should be worse than F 00 . So, we
arrive at the following definition.
Definition 3.2. Let n be a positive number. By an optimality criterion, we mean the pair
of relations (<, ∼) on the set S of all possible n-dimensional approximating families that
satisfies the following conditions:
• for every pair F, F 0 ∈ S, we have one and only one of the following options: either
F 0 < F or F < F 0 or F ∼ F 0 ;

10

• for every F , F 0 , and F 00 , if F < F 0 and F 0 < F 00 , then F < F 00 ;
• for every F , F 0 , and F 00 , if F < F 0 and F 0 ∼ F 00 , then F < F 00 ;
• for every F , F 0 , and F 00 , if F ∼ F 0 and F 0 < F 00 , then F < F 00 ;
• for every F , F 0 , and F 00 , if F ∼ F 0 and F 0 ∼ F 00 , then F ∼ F 00 ;
• for every F and F 0 , if F ∼ F 0 , then F 0 ∼ F .
Definition 3.3. Let (<, ∼) be an optimality criterion. We say that a family F is optimal
with respect to this optimality criterion if for every other family F 0 , we have either F 0 < F
or F 0 ∼ F .
We want to use an appropriate optimality criterion to select a family. If a criterion
selected several different families as equally good, then we can use this non-uniqueness to
optimize something else. For example, if we have several different families that provide an
equally good approximation, then, from all these optimal families, we can select, e.g., the
family which is the easiest to compute. This additional selection is, in effect, equivalent
to replacing the original optimality criterion with the new one <new , according to which
F <new F 0 if:
• either F < F 0 according to the original criterion,
• or F ∼ F 0 and F 0 is easier to compute (in some formal sense, e.g., in terms of the
computation time).
If the new criterion still selects several families as equally optimal, we can again modify
it, etc. – until we end up with a final criterion for which there is exactly one optimal family.

Definition 3.4. We say that an optimality criterion is final if it has exactly one optimal
family.

11

As a starting point for measuring x, we can take different locations. If we select a
different location which is x0 units before the current one, then each new location x is
identical to the old location x0 = x + x0 . So, the same profile approximation that in the
new units has the form f (x) in the old units has the form f (x + x0 ). The relative quality
of different profiles approximations should not change if we simply change the starting
location. Thus, we arrive at the following definitions.
Definition 3.5. For each family F as described by the formula (3.1) and for each x0 , by a
shift Sx0 (F ), we mean a family
{C1 · (Sx0 f1 )(x) + . . . + Cn · (Sx0 fn )(x)},
def

where (Sx0 fi )(x) = fi (x + x0 ).
Definition 3.6. We say that an optimality criterion is shift-invariant if for every F , F 0 ,
and x0 , the following two properties hold:
• if F < F 0 , then Sx0 (F ) < Sx0 (F 0 );
• if F ∼ F 0 , then Sx0 (F ) ∼ Sx0 (F 0 ).
Similarly, nothing should change if we simply change the measuring unit for x – e.g.,
use miles instead of kilometers. If we replace the original measuring unit by a one which is
λ times larger, then the new value x is identical to the old value x0 = λ · x. So, the same
profile approximation that in the new units has the form f (x) in the old units has the form
f (λ · x). The relative quality of different profiles approximations should not change if we
simply change the measuring unit. Thus, we arrive at the following definitions.
Definition 3.7. For each family F as described by the formula (3.1) and for each λ > 0,
by a rescaling Rλ (F ), we mean a family
{C1 · (Rλ f1 )(x) + . . . + Cn · (Rλ fn )(x)},
def

where (Rλ fi )(x) = fi (λ · x).
12

Definition 3.8. We say that an optimality criterion is scale-invariant if for every F , F 0 ,
and λ > 0, the following two properties hold:
• if F < F 0 , then Rλ (F ) < Rλ (F 0 );
• if F ∼ F 0 , then Rλ (F ) ∼ Rλ (F 0 ).
Proposition 3.1. For every n and for every final shift- and scale-invariant optimality
criterion, the optimal family Fopt consists of polynomials of order ≤ n − 1.
Comment. This result is similar to results from [31].
Proof.
1◦ . Let us first prove that the optimal family is shift- and scale-invariant, i.e., that
Sx0 (Fopt ) = Rλ (Fopt ) = Fopt for all x0 and λ.
Let us first prove shift-invariance of Fopt . Since Fopt is optimal, for every family F , we
have F < Fopt or F ∼ Fopt . In particular, this is true for the family S−x0 (F ), i.e., either
S−x0 (F ) < Fopt or S−x0 (F ) ∼ Fopt . Since the optimality criterion is shift-invariant, this
implies that either Sx0 (S−x0 (F )) < Sx0 (Fopt ) or Sx0 (S−x0 (F )) ∼ Sx0 (Fopt ). However, as
one can easily check, we have Sx0 (S−x0 (F )) = F . Thus, for every family F , we have either
F < Sx0 (Fopt ) or F ∼ Sx0 (Fopt ). By definition of optimality, this means that the family
Sx0 (Fopt ) is also optimal.
Since the optimality criterion is final, there is only one optimal family, hence Sx0 (Fopt ) =
Fopt . Shift-invariance is proven.
Scale-invariance is proven similarly, by taking into account that for every F and every
λ, either R1/λ (F ) < Fopt or R1/λ (F ) ∼ Fopt . So, by applying the scaling Rλ to both sides
of these relations, we conclude that Rλ (Fopt ) is also optimal and thus, Rλ (Fopt ) = Fopt .
2◦ . Shift-invariance means that every element of the family Sx0 (Fopt ) also belongs to the
same family Fopt . Let fi (x) denote the functions whose linear combinations (3.1) form the
family Fopt . Then, in particular, invariance means that for every i, the shifted function
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fi (x + x0 ) is a linear combination of functions fj (x):
f1 (x + x0 ) = C11 (x0 ) · f1 (x) + . . . + C1n (x0 ) · fn (x);
...

(3.2)

fn (x + x0 ) = Cn1 (x0 ) · f1 (x) + . . . + Cnn (x0 ) · fn (x),
for some coefficients Cij depending on x0 .
For each i, we can take n different values x1 , . . . , xn of x and get a system of n linear
equations with n unknowns Ci1 (x0 ), . . . , Cin (x0 ):
fi (x1 + x0 ) = Ci1 (x0 ) · f1 (x1 ) + . . . + Cin (x0 ) · fn (x1 );
...
fi (xn + x0 ) = Ci1 (x0 ) · f1 (xn ) + . . . + Cin (x0 ) · fn (xn ).
By Cramer’s rule, the solutions Cij (x0 ) to this system can be represented as a ratio of two
polynomials in terms of fi (·). Since the functions fi (x) are smooth, this implies that the
functions Cij (x0 ) are also differentiable functions of x0 .
Thus, we can differentiate both sides of (3.2) by x0 and take x0 = 0. As a result, we
get a system of linear differential equations with constant coefficients:
f10 (x) = c11 · f1 (x) + . . . + c1n · fn (x);
...

(3.3)

fn0 (x) = cn1 · f1 (x) + . . . + cnn · fn (x),
def

where we denoted cij = Cij0 (0).
The general solution to such a system is well-known (see, e.g., [16, 31]): it is a linear
combination of terms of the type exp(λi · x) and xk · exp(λi · x), where λi are eigenvalues
of the matrix (cij ), and k ≤ n − 1 is a positive integer corresponding to the case when we
have a multiple eigenvalue.

14

3◦ . Similarly, scale-invariance means that every element of the family Rλ (Fopt ) also belongs
to Fopt . In particular, this means that for every i, the re-scaled function fi (λ · x) is a linear
combination of functions fj (x):
f1 (λ · x) = C11 (λ) · f1 (x) + . . . + C1n (λ) · fn (x);
...

(3.4)

fn (λ · x) = Cn1 (λ) · f1 (x) + . . . + Cnn (λ) · fn (x),
for some coefficients Cij depending on λ.
For each i, we can take n different values x1 , . . . , xn of x and get a system of n linear
equations with n unknowns Ci1 (λ), . . . , Cin (λ):
fi (λ · x1 ) = Ci1 (λ) · f1 (x1 ) + . . . + Cin (λ) · fn (x1 );
...
fi (λ · xn ) = Ci1 (λ) · f1 (xn ) + . . . + Cin (λ) · fn (xn ).
By Cramer’s rule, the solutions Cij (λ) to this system can be represented as a ratio of two
polynomials in terms of fi (·). Since the functions fi (x) are smooth, this implies that the
functions Cij (λ) are also differentiable functions of λ.
Thus, we can differentiate both sides of (3.4) by λ and take λ = 1. As a result, we get
the following system of linear differential equations:
x · f10 (x) = c11 · f1 (x) + . . . + c1n · fn (x);
...
x · fn0 (x) = cn1 · f1 (x) + . . . + cnn · fn (x),
def

where we denoted cij = Cij0 (1).
Here, for each i, we have
x · fi0 (x) = x ·
15

dfi
dfi
=
.
dx
dx/x

(3.5)

Since dx/x = d(ln(x)), we thus conclude that for the new variable X = ln(x) (for which
x = exp(X)) and for the corresponding functions Fi (X) = fi (exp(X)), we get the system
of linear differential equations with constant coefficients:
F10 (X) = c11 · F1 (X) + . . . + c1n · Fn (X);
...

(3.6)

Fn0 (x) = cn1 · F1 (X) + . . . + cnn · Fn (X).
Hence, similarly to the previous subsection, we conclude that each solution of this system
is a linear combination of terms of the type exp(λi · X) and
X k · exp(λi · X).
Substituting X = ln(x) into this formula, we conclude that each function fi (x) = Fi (ln(x))
is a linear combination of functions exp(λi · ln(x)) and
lnk (x) · exp(λi · ln(x)).
Here, exp(λi · ln(x)) = (exp(ln(x))λi = xλi .
Thus, each function fi (x) is a linear combination of functions xλi and
lnk (x) · xλi .

4◦ . Our functions fi (x) are both shift-invariant and scale-invariant. Thus, each of them has
to be both of form described at the end of Part 2 of this proof and of the form described
at the end of Part 3. So, out of terms from Part 2, we cannot have exponential terms with
non-zero λi – since these terms cannot be expressed in Part-3 form. Thus, the only possible
terms are terms xk with k ≤ n − 1.
So, each function fi (x) is a linear combination of such terms – and is, thus, a polynomial
of order ≤ n − 1. The proposition is proven.
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Chapter 4
Teaching Optimization: How to
Generate “Nice” Cubic Polynomials
In the previous chapter, we have shown that it is reasonable to approximate functions by
polynomials. In particular, it makes sense to consider polynomial objective functions. It is
therefore important to teach decision makers how to analyze such functions.
In general, people feel more comfortable with rational numbers than with irrational
ones. Thus, when teaching the beginning of calculus, it is desirable to have examples
of simple problems for which both zeros and extrema points are rational. Recently, an
algorithm was proposed for generating cubic polynomials with this property. However,
from the computational viewpoint, the existing algorithm is not the most efficient one: in
addition to applying explicit formulas, it also uses trial-and-error exhaustive search. In
this chapter, we describe a new computationally efficient algorithm for generating all such
polynomials: namely, an algorithm that uses only explicit formulas.
The abstracts related to this result appeared in [5] and [6]; the full paper will appear
in [7].

4.1

Formulation of the Problem

Need for nice calculus-related examples. After students learn the basics of calculus,
they practice in using the calculus tools to graph different functions y = f (x). Specifically,
• they find the roots (zeros), i.e., the values where f (x) = 0,
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• they find the extreme points, i.e., the values where the derivative is equal to 0,
• they find out whether the function is increasing or decreasing between different extreme points – by checking the signs of the corresponding derivatives,
and they use this information – plus the values of f (x) at several points x – to graph the
corresponding function.
For this practice, students need examples for which they can compute both the zeros
and the extreme points.
Cubic polynomials: the simplest case when such an analysis makes sense. The
simplest possible functions are polynomials. For linear functions, the derivative is constant,
so there are no extreme point. For quadratic functions, there is an extreme point, but,
after studying quadratic equations, students already know how to graph the corresponding
function, when it decreases, when it increases. So, for quadratic polynomials, there is no
need to use calculus.
The simplest case when calculus tools are needed is the case of cubic polynomials.
To make the materials simpler for students, it is desirable to limit ourselves to
rational roots. Students are much more comfortable with rational numbers than with
irrational ones. Thus, to make the corresponding example easier for students, it is desirable
to start with examples in which all the coefficients, all the zeros, and all the extreme points
of a cubic polynomial are rational.
Good news is that when we know that the roots are rational, it is (relatively) easy to find
these roots. Indeed, to find rational roots, we can use the Rational Root Theorem, according
to which for each rational root x = p/q (where p and q do not have any common divisors)
of a polynomial an · xn + an−1 · xn−1 + . . . + a0 with integer coefficients a0 , . . . , an−1 , an , the
numerator p is a factor of a0 , and the denominator q is a factor of an ; see, e.g., [28].
Thus, to find all the rational roots of a polynomial, it is sufficient:
• to list all factors p of the coefficient a0 ,
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• to list all factors q of the coefficient an , and then
• to check, for each pair (p, q) of the values from the two lists, whether the ratio p/q is
a root.
How can we find polynomials for which both zeros and extreme points are rational?
What is known. An algorithm for generating such polynomials was proposed in [3, 4].
This algorithm, however, is not the most efficient one: for each tuple of the corresponding
parameter values, it uses exhaustive trial-and-error search to produce the corresponding
nice cubic polynomial.
What we do in this chapter. In this chapter, we produce an efficient algorithm for
producing nice polynomials. Namely, we propose simple computational formulas with the
following properties:
• for each tuple of the corresponding parameters, these formulas produce coefficients
of a cubic polynomial for which all zeros and extreme points are rational, and
• every cubic polynomial with this property can be generated by applying these formulas to an appropriate tuple of parameters.
Thus, for each tuple of parameters, our algorithm requires the same constant number of
elementary computational steps (i.e., elementary arithmetic operations) – in contrast with
the existing algorithm, in which the number of elementary steps, in general, grows with
the values of the parameters.

4.2

Analysis of the Problem

Let us first simplify the problem. A general cubic polynomial with rational coefficients
has the form
a · X 3 + b · X 2 + c · X + d.
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(4.1)

We consider the case when this is a truly cubic polynomial, i.e., when a 6= 0.
Roots and extreme points of a function do not change if we simply divide all its values
by the same constant a. Thus, instead of considering the original polynomial (4.1) with
four parameters a, b, c, and d, it is sufficient to consider the following polynomial with only
three parameters:
X 3 + p · X 2 + q · X + r,

(4.2)

b
def c
def d
, q = , r = .
a
a
a

(4.3)

where
def

p=

When the coefficients a, b, c, and d of the original polynomial (4.1) were rational, the coefficients of the new polynomial (4.2) are rational as well; vice versa, if we have a polynomial
(4.2) with rational coefficients, then, for any rational a, we can have a polynomial (4.1) with
rational coefficients b = a · p, c = a · q, and d = a · r. Thus, to find cubic polynomials with
rational coefficients, rational roots, and rational extreme points, it is sufficient to consider
polynomials of type (4.2).
We can simplify the problem even further if we replace the original variable X with the
new variable
p
3

(4.4)

p
X =x− .
3

(4.5)

def

x=X+
for which

Substituting this expression for X into the formula (4.2), we get


p 3
p 2
p
+p· x−
+q· x−
+r =
3
3
3
 p 2
 p 3
p
·x−
+ p · x2 −
x3 − 3 · · x2 + 3 ·
3
3
3
 p 2
p
p
2·p· ·x+p·
+q·x−q· +r =
3
3
3


x−

x3 + α · x + β,
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(4.6)

where
p2
3

(4.7)

p · q 2p3
+
.
3
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(4.8)

α=q−
and
β =r−

The roots and extreme points of the new polynomial (4.6) are obtained from the roots
and extremes of the original polynomial (4.2) by shifting by a rational number p/3, so they
are all rational for the polynomial (4.6) if and only if they are rational for the polynomial
(4.2).
Describing in terms of roots. Let r1 , r2 , and r3 denote rational roots of the polynomial
(4.6). Then, we have
x3 + α · x + β = (x − r1 ) · (x − r2 ) · (x − r3 ) =
x3 − (r1 + r2 + r3 ) · x2 + (r1 · r2 + r2 · r3 + r1 · r3 ) · x − r1 · r2 · r3 .

(4.9)

By equating the coefficients at x2 , x, and 1 at both sides, we conclude that
r1 + r2 + r3 = 0,

(4.10)

α = r1 · r2 + r2 · r3 + r1 · r3 ,

(4.11)

β = −r1 · r2 · r3 .

(4.13)

r3 = −(r1 + r2 ).

(4.14)

and

From (4.10), we conclude that

Substituting the expression (4.14) into the formulas (4.11) and (4.13), we conclude that
α = r1 · r2 − r2 · (r1 + r2 ) − r1 · (r1 + r2 ) = −(r12 + r1 · r2 + r22 )

(4.15)

β = r1 · r2 · (r1 + r2 ).

(4.16)

and
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Now the polynomial (4.6) takes the following form:
x3 − (r12 + r1 · r2 + r22 ) · x + r1 · r2 · (r1 + r2 ).

(4.17)

Using the fact that the extreme points should also be rational. Let us now use
the fact that the extreme points should also be rational. Let x0 denote an extreme point,
i.e., a point at which the derivative of the polynomial (4.17) is equal to 0. Differentiating
the expression (4.17) and equating the derivative to 0, we get
3x20 − (r12 + r1 · r2 + r22 ) = 0.

(4.18)

The expression in parentheses can be equivalently described as
3
1
· (r1 + r2 )2 + · (r1 − r2 )2 = 3y 2 + z 2 ,
4
4

(4.19)

where we denoted
def

y =

r1 + r2
def r1 − r2
and z =
.
2
2

(4.20)

Substituting this expression (4.20) into the formula (4.18), we arrive at the following homogeneous quadratic relation with integer coefficients between the rational numbers x0 , y,
and z:
3x20 − 3y 2 − z 2 = 0.

(4.21)

If we divide both sides of equation (4.21) by y 2 , we get a new equation
3X02 − 3 − Z 2 = 0,

(4.22)

x0
def z
and Z = . When x0 , y, and z are rational, then X0 and Z
y
y
are also rational numbers. Vice versa, when X0 and Z form a rational-valued solution of
def

where we denoted X0 =

the equation (4.22), then, for any rational number y, by multiplying both sides of equation
(4.22) by y 2 , we can get a solution x0 = y · X0 , y, and z = y · Z of the equation (4.21).
Thus, to find all rational solutions of the equation (4.21), it is sufficient to find al rational
solutions of a simplified equation (4.22).
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The simplest solution and the resulting “nice” polynomials. One of the solution
of equation (4.22) is easy to find: namely, when X0 = −1, the equation (4.22) takes the
form Z 2 = 0, i.e., Z = 0.
This means that for every y, the values x0 = −y, y and z = 0 solve the equation (4.21).
The formulas (4.20) enable us to reconstruct r1 and r2 from y and z as
r1 = y + z and r2 = y − z.

(4.23)

In our case, this means r1 = r2 = y. Thus, due to (4.15) and (4.16), we have a polynomial
x3 + α · x + β with α = −3y 2 and β = 2y 3 .
By applying a shift by a rational number s, i.e., by replacing x with x = X + s, we
transform a “nice” polynomial x3 + α · x + β into a new “nice” polynomial
(X + s)3 + α · (X + s) + β = X 3 + 3s · X 2 + (3s2 + α) · X + (s3 + β),
i.e., a polynomial (4.2) with p = 3s, q = 3s2 + α, and r = s3 + β. Finally, by multiplying
this polynomial by a rational number a, we get the following family of “nice” polynomials:
b = 3a · s, c = a · (3s2 + α), d = a · (s3 + β).

(4.24)

In our case, with α = −3y 2 and β = 2y 3 , we get
b = 3a · s, c = a · (3s2 − 3y 2 ), d = a · (s3 + 2y 3 ).

(4.24a)

Using the general algorithm for finding all rational solutions to a quadratic
equation. To find all rational solutions of the equation (4.21), we will use a general
algorithm for finding all rational solutions of a homogeneous quadratic equation with integer
coefficients; see, e.g., [38].
We have already found a solution of the equation (4.22) corresponding to X0 = −1. For
this value X0 , the equation (4.22) has only one solution (−1, 0), for which X0 = −1 and
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Z = 0. Every other solution (X0 , Z) can be connected to this simple solution (−1, 0) by a
straight line. A general equation of a straight line passing through the point (−1, 0) is
Z = t · (X0 + 1).

(4.25)

Z
is also rational.
X0 + 1
Substituting the expression (4.25) into the equation (4.22), we get

When X0 and Z are rational, the ratio t =

3X02 − 3 − t2 · (X0 + 1)2 = 0,
i.e.,
3 · (X02 − 1) − t2 · (X0 + 1)2 = 0.

(4.26)

Since we consider the case when X0 6= −1, we thus have X0 + 1 6= 0. So, we can divide
both sides of the equation (4.26) by X0 + 1 and thus, get the following equation:
3 · (X0 − 1) − t2 · (X0 + 1) = 0.
From this equation, we can describe X0 in terms of t: (3 − t2 ) · X0 = 3 + t2 , hence
X0 =

3 + t2
.
3 − t2

(4.27)

Substituting this expression for X0 into the formula (4.25), we conclude that
Z=

6t
.
3 − t2

(4.28)

Towards a general description of all “nice” polynomials. For every rational y, we
can now take x0 = y · X0 , y, and
z =y·Z =

6yt
.
3 − t2

(4.29)

Based on y and z, we can compute r1 and r2 by using the formulas (4.23).
We can now use the values r1 and r2 from (4.23) and the formulas (4.15) and (4.16) to
compute α and β. Since here, r1 + r2 = 2y, we get
α = r1 · r2 − (r1 + r2 )2 = (y + z) · (y − z) − (2y)2 = y 2 − z 2 − 4y 2 = −3y 2 − z 2
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(4.30)

and
β = r1 · r2 · (r1 + r2 ) = (y 2 − z 2 ) · (2y) = 2y · (y 2 − z 2 ).

(4.31)

Substituting these expressions for α and β into the formula (4.24), we get the formulas for
computing the coefficients of the corresponding “nice” cubic polynomial:
b = 3a · s;

(4.32)

c = a · (3s2 + α) = a · (3s2 − 3y 2 − z 2 );

(4.33)

d = a · (s3 + β) = a · (s3 + 2y · (y 2 − z 2 )).

(4.34)

Thus, we arrive at the following algorithm for computing all possible “nice” cubic polynomials.

4.3

Resulting Algorithm

Here is an algorithm for computing all “nice” cubic polynomials, i.e., all cubic polynomials
with rational coefficients for which all three roots and both extreme points are rational.
In this algorithm, we use four arbitrary rational numbers t, y, s, and a. Based on these
numbers, we first compute
z=

6yt
.
3 − t2

(4.29a)

Then, we compute the coefficients b, c, and d of the resulting “nice” polynomial (the value
a we already know):
b = 3a · s;

(4.32)

c = a · (3s2 − 3y 2 − z 2 );

(4.33a)

d = a · (s3 + 2y · (y 2 − z 2 )).

(4.34a)

These expressions cover almost all “nice” polynomials, with the exception of one family
of such polynomials, which is described by the formula
b = 3a · s, c = a · (3s2 − 3y 2 ), d = a · (s3 + 2y 3 ).
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(4.24a)

Chapter 5
How to Speed Up Computations:
Representing Functions in Quantum
and Reversible Computing
From the purely mathematical viewpoint, it is sufficient to formulate the practical problem
in precise mathematical terms. However, from the practical viewpoint, even after this
formulation, we still need to solve the corresponding computational problem. For simple
problems, the existing algorithms provide solutions in reasonable time. However, for more
complex problems, the existing algorithms take too long a time. It is therefore necessary to
explore the possibility of faster computations. One such possibility is the use of quantum
computing. There are many existing algorithms for quantum computing, but, as we show
in this chapter, they often do not provide an adequate representation of generic functions
– and objective functions corresponding to decision making under uncertainty can be very
complex. In this section, we show how to come up with more adequate representation of
generic functions in quantum computing.

5.1

Formulation of the Problem

Need for faster computing. While computers are very fast, in many practical problems,
we need even faster computations. For example, we can, in principle, with high accuracy
predict in which direction a deadly tornado will turn in the next 15 minutes, but this
computation requires hours even on the most efficient high performance computers – too
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late for the resulting prediction to be of any use.
Faster computations means smaller processing units. One of the main limitations
on physical processes is the fact that, according to modern physics, all processes cannot
move faster than the speed of light. For a laptop of size ≈ 30 cm, this means that it takes
at least 1 nanosecond (10−9 sec) for a signal to move from one side of the laptop to the
other. During this time, even the cheapest laptops perform several operations. Thus, to
speed up computations, we need to further decrease the size of the computer – and thus,
further decrease the size of its memory units and processing units.
Need for quantum computing. Already the size of a memory cell in a computer is
compatible with the size of a molecule. If we decrease the computer cells even more, they
will consist of a few dozen molecules. Thus, to describe the behavior of such cells, we will
need to take into account the physical laws that describe such micro-objects – i.e., the laws
of quantum physics.
Quantum computing means reversible computing. For macro-objects, we can observe irreversible processes: e.g., if we drop a china cup on a hard floor, it will break into
pieces, and no physical process can combine these pieces back into the original whole cup.
However, on the micro-level, all the equations are reversible. This is true for Newton’s
equations that describe the non-quantum motion of particles and bodies, this is true for
Schroedinger’s equation that takes into account quantum effects that describes this notion;
see, e.g., [12, 41].
Thus, in quantum computing, all elementary operations must be reversible.
Reversible computing beyond quantum. Reversible computing is also needed for a
different reasons. Even at the present level of micro-miniaturization, theoretically, we could
place more memory cells and processing cells into the same small volume if, instead of the
current 2-D stacking of these cells into a planar chip, we could stack them in 3-D.
For example, if we have a Terabyte of memory, i.e., 1012 cells in a 2-D arrangement,
this means 106 × 106 . If we could get a third dimension, we would be able to place 106 ×
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106 × 106 = 1018 cells in the same volume – million times more than now.
The reason why we cannot do it is that already modern computers emit a large amount
of heat. Even with an intensive inside-computer cooling, a working laptop warms up so
much that it is possible to be burned if you keep it in your lap. If instead of a single 2-D
layer, we have several 2-D layers forming a 3-D structure, the amount of heat will increase
so much that the computer will simply melt.
What causes this heat? One of the reasons may be design flaws. Some part of this
heat may be decreased by an appropriate engineering design. However, there is also a
fundamental reason for this heat: Second Law of Thermodynamics, according to which,
every time we have an irreversible process, heat is radiated, in the amount T · S, where S
is the entropy – i.e., in this case, the number of bits in information loss; see, e.g., [12, 41].
Basic logic operations (that underlie all computations) are irreversible. For example, when
a & b is false, it could be that both a and b were false, it could be that one of them was
false. Thus, the usual “and”-operation (a, b) → a & b is not reversible.
So, to decrease the amount of heat, a natural idea is to use only reversible operations.
How operations are made reversible now? At present, in quantum (and reversible)
computing, a bit-valued function y = f (x1 , . . . , xn ) is transformed into the following reversible operation:
Tf : (x1 , . . . , xn , x0 ) → (x1 , . . . , xn , x0 ⊕ f (x1 , . . . , xn )),
where x0 is an auxiliary bit-valued variable, and ⊕ denotes “exclusive or”, i.e., addition
modulo 2; see, e.g., [33].
It is easy to see that the above operation is indeed reversible: indeed, if we apply it
twice, we get the same input back:
Tf (Tf (x1 , . . . , xn , x0 )) = Tf (x1 , . . . , xn , x0 ⊕ f (x1 , . . . , xn )) =
(x1 , . . . , xn , x0 ⊕ f (x1 , . . . , xn ) ⊕ f (x1 , . . . , xn )).
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For addition modulo 2, a ⊕ a = 0 for all a, so indeed
x0 ⊕ f (x1 , . . . , xn ) ⊕ f (x1 , . . . , xn ) = x0 ⊕ (f (x1 , . . . , xn ) ⊕ f (x1 , . . . , xn )) = x0
and thus,
Tf (Tf (x1 , . . . , xn , x0 )) = (x1 , . . . , xn , x0 ).

Limitations of the current reversible representation of functions. The main limitation of the above representation is related to the fact that we rarely write algorithms
“from scratch”, we usually use existing algorithms as building blocks.
For example, when we write a program for performing operations involving sines and
cosines (e.g., a program for Fourier Transform), we do not write a new code for sines
and cosines from scratch, we use standard algorithms for computing these trigonometric
functions – algorithms contained in the corresponding compiler. Similarly, if in the process
of solving a complex system of nonlinear equations, we need to solve an auxiliary system
of linear equations, we usually do not write our own code for this task – we use existing
efficient linear-system packages. In mathematical terms, we form the desired function as a
composition of several existing functions.
From this viewpoint, if we want to make a complex algorithm – that consists of several
moduli – reversible, it is desirable to be able to transform the reversible versions of these
moduli into a reversible version of the whole algorithm. In other words, it is desirable to
generate a reversible version of each function so that composition of functions would be
transformed into composition. Unfortunately, this is not the case with with the existing
scheme described above. Indeed, even in the simple case when we consider the composition
f (f (x1 )) of the same function f (x1 ) of one variable, by applying the above transformation
twice, we get – as we have shown – the same input x1 back, and not the desired value
f (f (x1 )).
Thus, if we use the currently used methodology to design a reversible version of a
modularized algorithm, we cannot use the modular stricture, we have, in effect, to rewrite
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the algorithm from scratch. This is not a very efficient idea.
Resulting challenge, and what we do in this chapter. The above limitation shows
that there is a need to come up with a different way of making a function reversible, a
way that would transform composition into composition. This way, we will have a more
efficient way of making computations reversible.
This is exactly what we do in this chapter.

5.2

Analysis of the Problem and the Resulting Recommendation

Simplest case: description. Let us start with the simplest case of numerical algorithms,
when we have a single real-valued input x and a single real-valued output y. Let us denote
the corresponding transformation by f (x).
In general, this transformation is not reversible. So, to make it reversible, we need to
consider an auxiliary input variable u – and, correspondingly, an auxiliary output variable
v which depends, in general, on x and u: v = vf (x, u). The resulting transformation
(x, u) → (f (x), vf (x, u)) should be reversible.
How to make sure that composition is transformed into composition. Let us fix
some value of the auxiliary variable u that we will use, e.g., the value u = 0. We want to
make sure that when x = 0, then in the resulting pair (y, v), the second value v is also 0,
i.e., that vf (x, 0) = 0. This way, (x, 0) is transformed into (x0 , 0) = (f (x), 0). So, if after
this, we apply the reversible analogue of g(x), we get (g(x0 ), 0) = (g(f (x)), 0).
What does “reversible” mean here? In the computer, real numbers are represented
with some accuracy ε. Because of this, there are finitely many possible computer representations of real numbers.
Reversibility means that inputs and outputs are in 1-1 correspondence, and thus, for
each 2-D region r, its image after the transformation (x, u) → (y, v) should contain exactly
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as many pairs as the original region r.
Each pair (x, u) of computer-representable real numbers takes the area of ε2 in the
(x, u)-plane. In each region of this plane, the number of possible computer-representable
numbers is therefore proportional of the area of this region. Thus, reversibility means that
the transformation (x, u) → (f (x), v(x, u)) should preserve the area.
From calculus, it is known that, in general, under a transformation
(x1 , . . . , xn ) → (f1 (x1 , . . . , xn ), . . . , fn (x1 , . . . , xn )),
the n-dimensional volume is multiplied by the determinant of the matrix with elements
∂fi
. Thus, reversibility means that this determinant should be equal to 1.
∂xj
Let us go back to our simple case. For the transformation (x, u) → (f (x), vf (x, u)),
the matrix of the partial derivatives has the form


0
f (x) 0


∂vf ∂vf ,
∂x
∂u
where, as usual, f 0 (x) denoted the derivative. Thus, equating the determinant of this
matrix to 1 leads to the following formula
f 0 (x) ·

∂vf
= 1,
∂u

from which we conclude that
1
∂vf
= 0 .
∂u
f (x)
Thus,
Z
vf (x, U ) = vf (x, 0) +
0

U

∂vf
du = vf (x, 0) +
∂u

vf (x, 0) +

U
f 0 (x)

.

We know that vf (x, 0) = 0, thus we have
vf (x, u) =
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u
f 0 (x)

,

Z
0

U

1
f 0 (x)

du =

and the transformation takes the form

(x, u) →

u
f (x), 0
f (x)


.

Examples.
• For f (x) = exp(x), we have f 0 (x) = exp(x) and thus, the reversible analogue is
(x, u) → (exp(x), u · exp(−x)).
• For f (x) = ln(x), we have f 0 (x) = 1/x and thus, the reversible analogue is (x, u) →
(x, u · x).
Comment. The above formula cannot be directly applied when f 0 (x) = 0. In this case,
since anyway, we consider all the numbers modulo the “machine zero” ε – the smallest
positive number representable in a computer – we can replace f 0 (x) with the machine zero.

General case. Similarly, if we have a general transformation
def

(x1 , . . . , xn ) → f (x1 , . . . , xn ) = (f1 (x1 , . . . , xn ), . . . , fn (x1 , . . . , xn )),
we want to add an auxiliary variable u and consider a transformation
(x1 , . . . , xn , u) → (f1 (x1 , . . . , xn ), . . . , fn (x1 , . . . , xn ), vf (x1 , . . . , xn , u)).
To make sure that composition is preserved, we should take vf (x1 , . . . , xn , 0) = 0. Thus,
from the requirement that the volume is preserved, we conclude that
vf (x1 , . . . , xn , u) =

u
.
∂fi
det
∂xj

Resulting recommendation. To make the transformation
(x1 , . . . , xn ) → (f1 (x1 , . . . , xn ), . . . , fn (x1 , . . . , xn ))
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reversible, we should consider the the following mapping:





(x1 , . . . , xn , u) → 
f1 (x1 , . . . , xn ), . . . , fn (x1 , . . . , xn ),

5.3


u
.
∂fi 
det
∂xj

Discussion

Need to consider floating-point numbers. In the previous text, we considered only
fixed-point real numbers, for which the approximation accuracy ε – the upper bound on
the difference between the actual number and its computer representation – is the same for
all possible values xi .
In some computations, however, we need to use floating-point numbers, in which instead
of directly representing each number as a binary fraction, we, crudely speaking, represent
its logarithm: e.g., in the decimal case, 1 000 000 000 is represented as 109 , where 9 is
the decimal logarithm of the original number. In this case, we represent all these logarithms with the same accuracy ε. In this case, the volume should be preserved for the
transformation of logarithms ln(xi ) into logarithms ln(fj ), for which
xj ∂fi
∂ ln(fi )
·
.
=
∂ ln(xj )
fi ∂xj
In this case, formulas similar to the 1-D case imply that the resulting reversible version has
the form





(x1 , . . . , xn , u) → 
f1 (x1 , . . . , xn ), . . . , fn (x1 , . . . , xn ),

u
det

xj ∂fi
·
fi ∂xj


.


In some cases, the input is a fixed-point number while the output is a floating point
number; this happens, e.g., for f (x) = exp(x) when the input x is sufficiently large. In this
case, we need to consider the dependence of ln(f ) of x.
Case of functions of two variables. If we are interested in a single function of two
variables f (x1 , x2 ), then it makes sense not to add an extra input, only an extra output,
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i.e., to consider a mapping (x1 , x2 ) → (f (x1 , x2 ), g(x1 , x2 )), for an appropriate function
g(x1 , x2 ).
The condition that the volume is preserved under this transformation means that
∂f ∂g
∂f ∂g
·
−
·
= 1.
∂x1 ∂x2 ∂x2 ∂x1
For example, for f (x1 , x2 ) = x1 + x2 , we get the condition
∂g
∂g
−
= 1.
∂x2 ∂x1
This expression can be simplified if, instead of the original variables x1 and x2 , we use new
u2 − u1
u1 + u2
and x2 =
. In
variables u1 = x1 − x2 and u2 = x1 + x2 for which x1 =
2
2
terms of the new variables, the original function g(x1 , x2 ) has the form


u1 + u2 u2 − u1
,
G(u1 , u2 ) = f
.
2
2
For this new function,
1 ∂g
1 ∂g
1
∂G
= ·
− ·
=− .
∂u1
2 ∂x1 2 ∂x2
2
Thus,
1
G(u1 , u2 ) = − · u1 + C(u2 )
2
for some function C(u2 ), i.e., substituting the expressions for ui ,
g(x1 , x2 ) =

x2 − x1
+ C(x1 + x2 ).
2

So, to make addition reversible, we may want to have subtraction – the operation inverse
to addition; this make intuitive sense.
Similarly, for f (x1 , x2 ) = x1 · x2 , we get the condition
∂g
∂g
− x1 ·
= 1.
∂x2
∂x1

x2 ·

This expression can be simplified if we realize that xi ·
def

Xi = ln(xi ). In these terms, we have
∂g
∂g
−
= 1,
∂X2 ∂X1
34

∂f
∂f
=
, where we denoted
∂xi
∂Xi

and thus, as in the sum example, we get
g(X1 , X2 ) =

X2 − X1
+ C(X1 + X2 ).
2

Thus, we get
g(x1 , x2 ) =

ln(x2 ) − ln(x1 )
+ C(ln(x1 ) + ln(x2 )),
2

i.e.,
1
f (x1 , x2 ) = · ln
2



x2
x1


+ C(x1 · x2 ).

So, to make multiplication reversible, we need to add a (function of) division – the operation
inverse to multiplication. This also makes common sense.
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Chapter 6
First Application to Finance: Is “No
Trade Theorem” Really a Paradox
One of the challenges in foundations of finance is the so-called “no trade theorem” paradox:
if an expert trader wants to sell some stock, that means that this trader believes that this
stock will go down; however, the very fact that another expert trader is willing to buy
it means that this other expert believes that the stock will go up. The fact that equally
good experts have different beliefs should dissuade the first expert from selling – and thus,
trades should be very rare. However, in reality, trades are ubiquitous. In this chapter, we
show that a detailed application of decision theory solves this paradox and explains how
a trade can be beneficial to both seller and buyer. This application also explains a known
psychological fact – that depressed people are usually more risk-averse.
Results from this chapter first appeared in [8].

6.1

Formulation of the Problem

“No trade theorem” paradox. When a bank or a hedge fund wants to buy a stock,
this means that professionals running this financial institution believe that, in the future,
this stock will increase in price. This makes perfect sense until we realize that for this
institution to be able to buy this stock, some other institution needs to be willing to sell it
at this price – which means that professionals running that other instutition must believe
that, in the future, this stock will decrease in price.
Stock market is not a game for amateurs, serious agents buying and selling stock are
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smart experts who know what they are doing and who, in the past, have shown a good
intuition about future stock values. So, even when such an expert initially thinks that this
stock will increase in price, the very fact that this stock is available for sale means that
another expert has an exactly opposite belief. This should, in many cases, dissuade the
first expert from his or her original belief.
Similarly, an expert who is initially eager to sell, i.e., who initially believes that this
stock will decrease in price, should be dissuaded by the presence of similarly qualified
experts who are willing to buy, i.e., who believe that this stock will increase in price.
If we follow this logic, then very few agents will be trading stocks – but in reality, the
trading volume is very high, every second, a huge amount of stocks change hands. This
paradoxical behavior is known as a “no trade theorem”; see, e.g., [27, 40].
What we do in this chapter. In this chapter, we use decision making to show that in
reality, trading makes perfect sense if we take into account different risks associated with
different stocks.
Our explanation also explains another empirical phenomenon, a phenomenon from psychology – that depressed people are more risk-averse.

6.2

Analysis of the Problem and the Resulting Explanation of the “No Trade Theorem” Paradox

Towards formulation of the problem in precise terms. Let us assume that the
person originally had the amount M of money. This person is thinking of possibly buying
a stock which costs s.
Let us also assume an ideal situation, in which everyone has the same information about
the future value of this stock, namely, everyone knows the probability distribution of its
next year’s gain. In particular, everyone knows the mean m0 and the standard deviation
σ 0 of this future gain. After discounting, we get the mean m = q · m0 and the standard
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deviation σ = q · σ 0 of the equivalent current gain.
Let us also make a realistic assumption that the price s, the mean m, and the standard
deviation σ are much smaller than the current money amount M . In other words, we
assume that we are talking about a usual trade, not about extreme situations in which a
person gambles his or her whole fortune by investing it all in a seemingly attractive stock.
Analysis of the problem. Let us denote the difference between the actual (discounted)
def

value v of the stock and its mean value m by ∆v = v − m. By definition of the mean,
we have m = E[v], where E[·] denoted the mean value. Thus, the mean value of ∆v is 0:
E[∆v] = 0.
The mean value of (∆v)2 is, by definition, equal to σ 2 : E [(∆v)2 ] = σ 2 .
In these terms, the (discounted) future gain is equal to v = m + ∆v. The discounted
future amount of money can be obtained if we take the original amount M , subtract the
cost s of the stock, and add the gained value v = m + ∆v; as a result, we get the value
M − s + m + ∆v.
The utility is proportional to the square root of money. We can always select a unit of
utility so that utility will be exactly equal to the square root of money. In this case, the
√
original utility is u = M , and the discounted future utility corresponding to buying a
√
stock is equal to u = M − s + m + ∆v.
As we have mentioned in the previous section, a rational person should select the alternative with the largest possible value of expected utility E[u]. Thus, for the agent, it
makes sense to buy the stock if
E[u] = E

h√

i √
M − s + m + ∆v > M .

If we have a reverse inequality, then, as one can easily see, it is beneficial for this person to
sell this stock. So, to decide whether it is beneficial for a person to sell or buy the stock,
√

we need to estimate the value E[u] = E M − s + m + ∆v of the expected utility.
Estimating the value of the expected utility. We assumed that the values m, s, and σ
are much smaller than M . Thus, the corresponding random value ∆v is also much smaller
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than M . So, we can expand the expression

√

M − s + m + ∆v in Taylor series in terms of

s, m, and ∆v, and keep only linear and quadratic terms in this expansion. As a result, we
get the following expression:
√

M − s + m + ∆v =

√

1
1
M + √ · (−s + m + ∆v) −
· (−s + m + ∆v)2 .
3/2
4
·
M
2 M

If we open the parentheses and take into account that E[∆v] = 0 and E [(∆v)2 ] = σ 2 , we
conclude that the expected utility of buying the stock is equal to
√

1
1
M + √ · (m − s) −
· ((m − s)2 + σ 2 ).
4 · M 3/2
2 M
√
√
Thus, this value is larger than the original utility M if and only if E[u] − M > 0, i.e.,
E[u] =

if and only if
1
1
√ · (m − s) −
· ((m − s)2 + σ 2 ) > 0.
3/2
4
·
M
2 M
Multiplying both sides by 4 · M 3/2 , we get an equivalent inequality
2M · (m − s) − ((m − s)2 + σ 2 ) > 0,
i.e., equivalently, 2M · (m − s) > ((m − s)2 + σ 2 ) and
def

M > M0 =

(m − s)2 + σ 2
.
2(m − s)

(6.1)

This explains the “no trade theorem” paradox. For the same stock with the same
information about its future gains, whether it is beneficial to buy it or sell it depends on
the initial amount of money that a trader has:
• if the trader has a large amount of money M , then buying a stock whose expected
benefits m exceed the buying cost s makes perfect sense, even when the risk σ is
reasonably high;
• on the other hand, if the trader has a not so large amount of money and the stock is
risky, then for this trader, it makes sense to sell this stock.
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For this stock, for almost all traders (with a rare exception of a trader whose current
amount is exactly M0 ), it is either beneficial to buy (if M > M0 ) or to sell (if M < M0 ).
Thus, for the same stock, with the same information, we always have many traders for
whom it is beneficial to buy, and we have many traders for whom it is beneficial to sell.
This explains the ubiquity of trading.

6.3

Auxiliary Result: Decision Theory Explains Why
Depressed People Are More Risk-Averse

Empirical fact. It has been observed that depressed people are more risk-averse, i.e., they
are less willing to make decisions involving risks; see, e.g., [23, 29].
Our explanation. Each risky decision is described by the same formulas as a particular
case of buying-a-stock risky decision: we may gain something, we may lose something, all
we know is the probability distribution of the corresponding gains and losses.
Thus, to decide when it is beneficial to participate in a risky activity, we can use the
same formulas as above – the only difference is that instead of just money amount M and
√
the corresponding initial utility u0 = M , we can take into account different things that
affect the person’s utility. In terms of utility u0 , the inequality (6.1) – that describes when
it is beneficial for a person to engage in a risky behavior – takes the form
def

u20 > M0 =

(m − s)2 + σ 2
.
2(m − s)

(6.2)

This formula says that when the initial value of the utility u0 is small, risky behavior – with
large σ – is not beneficial. And this is exactly what depression means in decision-theoretic
terms: that a person is not very happy, i.e., that the corresponding utility value u0 is small.
Thus, our decision-theoretic analysis explains the above-mentioned psychological phenomenon.
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Chapter 7
Second Application to Finance:
Decision Theory Can Explain Why
Buying and Selling Prices Are
Different
7.1

Buying and Selling Prices Are Different: a Phenomenon and Its Current Quantitative Explanations

Buying and selling prices are different: a phenomenon. According to the naive
understanding of economic behavior, we should decide, for ourselves, how much each object
is worth to us. This worth amount should be the largest amount that we should be willing
to pay if we are buying this object, and this same amount should be the smallest amount
for which we should agree to sell this objects.
However, in many experiments, the price participants are willing to pay to buy a certain
item is different from the price they are willing to accept to part with this item. For example,
students are willing to pay $3 for a mug but require to be paid at least $7 to sell it back.
In other words, people estimate the consequences of losing an object differently than the
consequences of gaining the same object; see, e.g., [20, 40] and references therein.
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Current explanations of this phenomenon. The current explanation of this phenomenon is based on the fact that people are not clear on the value of each object. Instead
of the exact monetary amount, at best, they have a range [u, u] of possible values of this
object’s worth; see, e.g., [14, 15].
Need for a more detailed analysis. While [14, 15] provide a qualitative explanation
for the loss aversion phenomenon, it is desirable to extend this to a quantitative analysis,
an analysis that takes into account known results about rational decision making under
interval uncertainty. This is what we do in this chapter.
Results from this chapter will appear in [10].

7.2

Quantitative Explanation

Decision making under interval uncertainty: case of monetary values. How can
we make decision if, instead of the exact value of an object, we only know the interval [u, u]
of possible values? In other words, what is the value u(u, u) that we are willing to pay for
this object?
Clearly, since we know that the object is worth at least u and at most u, this means
that the price u(u, u) that we are willing to pay should also be at least u and at most u:
u ≤ u(u, u) ≤ u.

(7.1)

This property is known as boundedness.
Another reasonable requirement is that if we have two different objects, with values in
[u, u] and [v, v], then the price that we are willing to pay to buy both should be equal to
the prices that we pay for each of them. Let us describe this second requirement in precise
terms.
When we get two objects together, the smallest possible value of our purchase is when
both objects are worth their smallest amounts u and v. In this case, the overall worth of
both objects is equal to the sum u + v. Similarly, the largest possible value of our purchase
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is when both objects are worth their largest amounts u and v. In this case, the overall
worth of both objects is equal to the sum u + v. Thus, for two objects sold together the
interval of possible worth values is [u + v, u, u + v]. So, the second requirement takes the
following form:
u(u + v, u + v) = u(u, u) + u(v, v).

(7.2)

This property is known as additivity.
It turns out (see, e.g., [22]) that the only functions that satisfy both requirements (7.1)
and (7.2) are functions of the type
u(u, u) = αH · u + (1 − αH ) · u,

(7.3)

for some αH ∈ [0, 1]. This fact easily follows from the fact that all bounded additive
functions are linear; see, e.g., [1].
As we have mentioned in Chapter 2, the formula (7.3) was first proposed – for the case
of utilities – by a future Nobelist Leo Hurwicz and is thus known as Hurwicz optimismpessimism criterion [17, 25]. We have just shown that a similar formula can be used to
estimate monetary value under interval uncertainty.
Hurwicz criterion explains the difference between buy and sell prices. When we
buy an object whose worth is between u and u, the best possible gain is u and the worst
possible gain is u. Thus, according to the Hurwicz criterion, we should be willing to pay
the amount ub (b for buy) which is equal to
ub = αH · u + (1 − αH ) · u.

(7.4)

On the other hand, if we already own this object and we sell it, then our loss is between
−u and −u. The most optimistic estimate for our resulting state is −u and the most
pessimistic estimate is −u. In this case, according to the Hurwicz criterion, this is equivalent
to the value of
αH · (−u) + (1 − αH ) · (−u).
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(7.5)

Thus, to compensate for this loss, we need to get the amount us (s for sell) that, when
added to the value (7.5), will result in 0, i.e., the value
us = αH · u + (1 − αH ) · u.

(7.6)

We can see that, in general, the expressions for the buy ub and sell us prices are different.
Indeed, the only time when the prices are equal, i.e., when ub = us , is when
αH · u + (1 − αH ) · u = αH · u + (1 − αH ) · u.
Moving all the terms to the left-hand side and adding resulting coefficients at u and u, we
conclude that
(2αH − 1) · u − (2αH − 1) · u = 0,
i.e., (2αH − 1) · (u − u) = 0. Since we consider the case when we have uncertainty, i.e.,
when u 6= u, we thus conclude that 2αH − 1 = 0, i.e., that αH = 0.5.
So, only people with αH = 0.5 buy and sell at exactly the same price. For everyone else
– who is even slightly more optimistic or even slightly less optimistic than αH = 0.5 – the
buy and sell prices are different, and this is exactly what we observe.
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Chapter 8
Decision Theory Explains
“Telescoping Effect” – That Our
Time Perception Is Biased
The two previous chapters describe the current decision making. If we take into account
events in the past – or possible future consequences – then we need to describe how people
perceive the corresponding time intervals.
People usually underestimate time passed since distant events, and overestimate time
passed since recent events. There are several explanations for this “telescoping effect”,
but most current explanations utilize specific features of human memory and/or human
perception. We show that the telescoping effect can be explained on a much basic level of
decision theory, without the need to invoke any specific ways we perceive and process time.
Results from this chapter will appear in [9].

8.1

Formulation of the Problem

Telescoping effect. It is known that when people estimate how long ago past events
happened, their estimates are usually biased (see, e.g., [11, 18, 39]):
• for recent events, people usually overestimate how much time has passed since this
event;
• on the other hand, for events in the more distant past, people usually underestimate
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how much time has passed since the event.
This phenomenon is called telescoping effect since the bias in perceiving long-ago past
events is similar to what happens when we look at the celestial objects via a telescope: all
the objects appear closer than when you look at them with a naked eye.
How can this effect be explained. There are many explanations for the telescope
effect [11, 18, 39], but most current explanations utilize specific features of human memory
and/or human perception.
What we do in this chapter. In this chapter, we show that the telescoping effect can be
explained on a much basic level of decision theory, without the need to invoke any specific
ways we perceive and process time.

8.2

How Decision Theory Can Explain the Telescoping Effect

People’s perceptions are imprecise. In the ideal situation, an event of utility u0 that
occurred t moments in the past should be equivalent to exactly the utility u = q t · u0 now.
In practice, however, people’s perceptions are imprecise.
Let us describe this imprecision: first approximation. Let us denote by ε the
accuracy of people’s perception. Then, for an event with actual utility u, the perceived
utility can differ by ε, i.e., it can take any value from the corresponding interval [u−ε, u+ε].
In particular, our perceived utility u of the past event can take any value from the interval
[q t · u0 − ε, q t · u0 + ε].
How we perceive events form the distant past. The above interval can be somewhat
narrowed down if we take into account that for a positive event, with utility u0 > 0, the
perception cannot be negative, while the value q t · u0 − ε is negative for large t. Thus, when
def ln(u0 /ε)
q t · u0 − ε < 0, i.e., when t > T0 =
, the lower bound of the interval is 0, and thus,
| ln(q)|
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the interval has the form
[u, u] = [0, q t · u0 + ε].
Based on Hurwicz’s optimism-pessimism criterion, this interval is equivalent to the value
αH · (q t · u0 + ε). How does this translate into a perceived time? For any time tp , the utility
of the event tp moments in the past is equal to q tp · u0 . Thus, the perceived time tp can
be found from the condition that the utility αH · (q t + ε) is equal to q tp · u0 . This equality
αH · (q t · u0 + ε) = q tp · u0 implies that
ln((αH · (q t · u0 + ε))/u0 )
tp =
.
ln(q)
In particular, when t tends to infinity, we have q t → 0 and thus, the perceived time tends
to a finite constant
ln((αH · ε)/u0 )
.
ln(q)
Thus, for large t we indeed have tp  t, which is exactly what we observe in the
telescoping effect for events from the distant past.
How we perceive very recent events. For recent events, the interval
[q t · u0 − ε, q t · u0 + ε]
can also be somewhat narrowed down if we take into account that the perceived utility of
a past event cannot exceed its utility now, i.e., the value u0 . Thus, when q t · u0 + ε > u0 ,
def ln(1 − u0 /ε)
i.e., when q t > 1 − ε/u0 and thus, t < t0 =
, the upper bound of the interval
ln(q)
is u0 , and thus, the interval has the form
[u, u] = [q t · u0 − ε, u0 ].
Based on Hurwicz’s optimism-pessimism criterion, this interval is equivalent to the value
αH · u0 + (1 − αH ) · (q t · u0 − ε). Similarly to the distant-past case, the perceived time tp
can be found from the condition that the above value is equal to q tp · u0 , i.e., that
αH · u0 + (1 − αH ) · (q t − ε) = q tp · u0 .
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This implies that
tp =

ln(αH + (1 − αH ) · (q t − ε/u0 ))
.
ln(q)

In particular, when t tends to 0, we have q t → 1 and thus, the perceived time tp tends to
a finite positive constant
ln(αH + (1 − αH ) · (1 − ε/u0 ))
.
ln(q)
Thus, for small t, we indeed have tp  t, which is exactly what we observe in the
telescoping effect for recent events.
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Chapter 9
Application to Geosciences: Bhutan
Landscape Anomaly Explained
Economies of countries located in seismic zones are strongly effected by this seismicity. If
we underestimate the seismic activity, then a reasonably routine earthquake can severely
damage the existing structures and thus, lead to huge economic losses. On the other
hand, if we overestimate the seismic activity, we waste a lot of resources on unnecessarily
fortifying all the buildings – and this too harms the economies. From this viewpoint,
it is desirable to have estimations of regional seismic activities which are as accurate as
possible. Current predictions are mostly based on the standard geophysical understanding
of earthquakes as being largely caused by the movement of tectonic plates and terranes.
This understanding works in most areas, but in Bhutan area of the Himalayas region, there
seems to be a landscape anomaly. As a result, for this region, we have less confidence in the
accuracy of seismic predictions based on the standard understanding and thus, have to use
higher seismic thresholds in construction. In this chapter, we find the optimal description
of landscape-describing elevation profiles, and we use this description to show that the
seeming anomaly is actually in perfect agreement with the standard understanding of the
seismic activity. Our conclusion is that it is safe to apply, in this region, estimates based on
the standard understanding and thus, avoid unnecessary expenses caused by an increased
threshold.
Results from this chapter will appear in [32].
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9.1

Formulation of the Problem

Seismicity affects economy. In highly seismic areas like the Himalayas, economy is
affected by our knowledge of possible seismicity.
Protection against possible earthquakes is very costly. If we have only a vague idea
about possible seismic events – i.e., if we can potentially expect high-energy earthquakes
at all possible locations – then, every time we build a house or a factory, we need to spend
a lot of money on making it protected against such events – with little money left for any
other development project.
On the other hand, if we can reasonably accurately localize potential hazards, then we
can concentrate our building efforts mostly in safer zones. This will require less investment
in earthquake protection and thus, leave more money for other development projects.
Thus, the economy of a highly seismic zone is directly affected by our understanding of
the corresponding seismic processes.
Bhutan landscape anomaly. In general, modern geophysics has a reasonably good
understanding of seismic processes and seismic zones. Specifically, the current understanding is that seismicity is usually caused by mutual movement of tectonic plates and their
parts (terranes), and it is mostly concentrated on the borderline between two or more such
plates or terranes. In general, while we still cannot predict the exact timing of earthquakes, geoscientists can reasonably well predict the size of a future earthquake based on
the corresponding geophysical models.
Researchers and practitioners are reasonably confident in these predictions – at least
for locations whose geophysics is well understood by the traditional geophysical models.
However, there are locations where observed phenomena are different from what we
usually expect. In such cases, there are reasonable doubts in seismicity estimates produced
by the traditional techniques – and thus, it is reasonable to be cautious and use higher
strengths of potential earthquakes when building in these locations, which invokes significant additional expenses. For such domains, it is therefore desirable to come up with a
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better understanding of the observed geophysical phenomena – thus hopefully allowing us
to make more accurate predictions and hence, save money (which is now wasted on possibly
too-heavy earthquake protection) for other important activities.
One such areas in the vicinity of the Himalayan country of Bhutan, where the landscape
profile is drastically different from the profiles of other Himalayan areas such as areas of
Nepal. In general, a landscape can be described in numerical terms if we take a line
orthogonal to the prevailing rivers (which are usually the lowest points on the landscape)
and plot the elevation as a function of the distance from the corresponding river. The
shape of the landscape (elevation) profile in Bhutan is visually drastically different from
the landscape profile in Nepal; see, e.g., [2]. Namely, in most of the Himalayas – and, in
general, in the most of the world – the corresponding curve is first convex (corresponding to
the river valley), and then becomes concave – which corresponds to the mountain peaks. In
contrast, in Bhutan, the profile turns concave very fast, way before we reach the mountain
peaks area.
As of now, there are no good well-accepted explanations for this phenomenon – which
makes it an anomaly. To be more precise, we know that the geophysics of the Bhutan area
is somewhat different: in Nepal (like in most areas in the world), the advancing tectonic
plate in orthogonal to the border of the mountain range, while in Bhutan, the plate pushes
the range at an angle. However, it is not clear how this can explain the above phenomenon.
This leads us to the following questions.
Questions. The first question is: can we explain the Bhutan anomaly within the existing
geophysical paradigm? If we can do, this would mean that this anomaly is not an obstacle
to applying this paradigm, and thus, that the estimates of future seismic activity obtained
within this paradigm can be safely applied – without the need to make expensive extra
precautions.
A related question is related to the fact that while we use convexity and concavity
to describe elevation profiles, the only reason for using these two properties is because
these are the basic properties that we learn in math. Is there any geophysical meaning in
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convexity vs. concavity?
What we do in this chapter. In this chapter, we provide answers to both questions:
we explain why convexity and concavity are adequate ways to describe elevation profiles,
and we explain how the at-an-angle pressure in the Bhutan area leads to the observed
convex-followed-by-concave phenomenon.
To answer these questions, we first formulate the problem of adequately describing
elevation profiles as an optimization problem. Then, we solve this problem, and use the
solution to answer the above two questions.

9.2

What Is the Optimal Description of Elevation
Profiles

How can we describe elevation profiles? An elevation profile results from the joint
effect of many different physical processes, from movement of tectonic plates to erosion.
These process are largely independent from each other: e.g., erosion works the same way
whether we have the landscape on the sea level or the same landscape which the geological
processes raised to some elevation. Because of this independence, the observed profile
f (x) can be reasonably well represented as the sum of profiles corresponding to different
processes:
f (x) = f1 (x) + . . . + fn (x).
Different profile-changing processes may have different intensity. So, to describe the
effect of the i-th process, instead of a fixed function fi (x), it is more appropriate to use the
correspondingly re-scaled term Ci · fi (x), where the coefficients Ci describe the intensity of
the i-th process, so that
f (x) = C1 · f1 (x) + . . . + Cn · fn (x).
Due to erosion, discontinuities in the elevation profiles are usually smoothed out, so we
can safely assume that the corresponding functions fi (x) are smooth (differentiable).
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For such families, the problem of selecting the optimal description was formulated and
solved in Chapter 3. The result was that the optimal approximating family is the family
of polynomials.

9.3

Why Convexity and Concavity Are Important in
Elevation Profiles: An Explanation Based on the
Optimality Result

Discussion. The above result provides us, for different n, with families of approximations
to the elevation profiles. Let us start with the simplest possible approximation.
For n = 1, we get the class of constant functions – no landscape at all. For n = 2,
we get a class of linear functions – no mountains, no ravines, just a flat inclined surface.
So, the only non-trivial description of a landscape starts with n = 3, i.e., with quadratic
functions.
We want to provide a qualitative classification of all such possible elevation functions.
It is reasonable to say that the two elevation functions are equivalent if they differ only by
re-scaling and shift of x and y:
Definition 9.1. We say that two quadratic functions f (x) and g(x) are equivalent if for
some values λx > 0, λy > 0, x0 , and y0 , we have
g(x) = λy · f (λx · x + x0 ) + y0
for all x.
Proposition 9.1. Every non-linear quadratic function is equivalent either to x2 or to −x2 .

Discussion. Thus, in this approximation, we have, in effect, two shapes: the shape
corresponding to x2 (convex) and the shape corresponding to −x2 (concave). This result
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explains why our visual classification into convex and concave shapes makes perfect sense.

Proof. Every non-linear quadratic function g(x) has the form
g(x) = a0 + a1 · x + a2 · x2 ,
for some a2 6= 0.
If a2 > 0, then this function can be represented as
2 


a21
a1
+ a0 −
,
a2 · x +
2a2
4a2
i.e., can be represented in the desired form, with f (x) = x2 , λx = 1, λy = a2 , x0 =
a21
.
4a2
If a2 < 0, then this function can be represented as

2 ! 

a1
a21
|a2 | · − x +
+ a0 −
,
2a2
4a2

a1
,
2a2

and y0 = a0 −

i.e., can be represented in the desired form, with f (x) = −x2 , λx = 1, λy = |a2 |, x0 =
a21
.
4a2
The proposition is proven.

a1
,
2a2

and y0 = a0 −

9.4

Bhutan Anomaly Explained

Discussion. In the previous text, we have shown that the optimal description of an
elevation profiles is by polynomials of a fixed degree.
In the first approximation, a landscape profile can be described by a quadratic function.
To get a more accurate description, let us also consider cubic terms, i.e., let us consider
profiles of the type
f (x) = a0 + a1 · x + a2 · x2 + a3 · x3 .
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(9.1)

As a starting point x = 0 for the elevation profile, it makes sense to select the lowest (or
the highest) point. In both cases, according to calculus, the first derivative of the elevation
profile is equal to 0 at this point: f 0 (0) = 0. Substituting the above expression for f (x)
into this formula, we conclude that a1 = 0 and thus,
f (x) = a0 + a2 · x2 + a3 · x3 .

(9.2)

Let us analyze how this approximation works for the above two cases: the case of Nepal
and the case of Bhutan.
Case of Nepal. In the case of Nepal, the forces compressing the upper plate are orthogonal
to the line of contact. This means that in this case, the forces do not change if we change
left to right and right to left.
Since the whole mountain range was created by this force, it is reasonable to conclude
that the corresponding elevation profile is also invariant with respect to swapping left and
right, i.e., with respect to the transformation x → −x:
f (x) = f (−x).

(9.3)

Substituting the cubic expression (9.2) for the profile f (x) into this formula, we conclude
that a3 = 0. Thus, in this case, the elevation profile is quadratic even in this next approximation – and is, therefore, either convex or concave.
Case of Bhutan. In the case of Bhutan, the force is applied at an angle. Here, there is
no symmetry with respect to x → −x, so, in general, we have a3 6= 0. Thus, the second
derivative – that describes whether a function is locally convex (when this second derivative
is positive) or locally concave (when the derivative is negative) – becomes a linear function
6a3 · x + 2a2 , with a3 6= 0.
A non-constant linear function always changes signs – this explains why in the case of
Bhutan, convexity follows by concavity.
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9.5

Auxiliary Question: How to Best Locate an Inflection Point

Practical problem. Many geophysical ideas are applicable only to valley-type convex
domains or only to mountain-type concave domains. So, to apply these ideas to a real-life
landscape, it is necessary to divide the whole landscape into convex and concave zones.
What is the best way to do it? In other words, what is the best way to locate an inflection
point, i.e., the point at which local convexity changes to local concavity?
First idea: a straightforward least squares approach. The first natural idea –
motivated by the above analysis – is to approximate the actual elevation profile by a cubic
function (9.1). The corresponding coefficients c0 , c1 , c2 , and c3 can be obtained, e.g., by
applying the least squares method to the corresponding system of linear equations
yi ≈ c0 + c1 · xi + c2 · x2i + c3 · x3i ,
where xi is the i-th location and yi is the i-th elevation.
The least squares method minimizes the sum
X
(yi − (c0 + c1 · xi + c2 · x2i + c3 · x3i ))2 .
i

Differentiating this expression with respect to each of the unknowns cj and equating all
four derivatives to 0, we get an easy-to-solve system of four linear equations with four
unknowns.
Once we find the characteristics, we then estimate the location of the inflection point
c2
as the value at which the second derivative is equal to 0, i.e., the value xinfl = −
.
3c3
Second idea: a model-free least squares approach. Instead of restricting ourselves
to a cubic approximation, we can consider general convex functions. For a function f (x)
defined by its values y1 = f (x1 ), y2 = f (x2 ), . . . , on a equally spaced grid
x1 , x2 = x1 + ∆x, x3 = x1 + 2∆x, . . . , xN ,
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convexity is equivalent to the sequence of inequalities
yi ≤

yi−1 + yi+1
.
2

(9.4)

For each set of actual profile points yei , we can therefore find the closest convex profile
by looking for the values yi that minimize the mean square error (MSE)
1 X
·
(e
yi − yi )2
N
i
under the constraints (9.4). The minimized expression is a convex function of the unknowns
yi , and each constraint – and thus, their intersection – defines a convex set. Thus, we can
find the corresponding minimum by using a known algorithm for convex optimization (=
minimizing a convex function on a convex domain); see, e.g., [34, 35, 37].
By applying this algorithm to actually convex profiles, we can find the largest and thus,
the corresponding MSE. Let us denote the largest of such values by M . Then, to find an
inflection point, we can consider larger and larger fragments of the original series f (x1 ),
f (x2 ), . . . , until we reach a point at which the corresponding MSE exceeds M . This is the
desired inflection point.
We can speed up this algorithm if instead of slowly increasing the size of the still-convex
fragment, we use bisection. Specifically, we always keep two values p and p such that the
fragment until p is convex (within accuracy M ), while the fragment up to the point p is
not convex within the given accuracy.
In the beginning, we first apply our criterion to the whole list of N values. If the result
is M -close to convex, we consider the profile convex – no inflection point here. If the result
is not M -convex, then we take p = 1 and p = N .
p+p
. If the segment up
2
to this midpoint is M -convex, then we replace p with m. If this segment is not M -convex,
def

Once we have two values p < p, we then take a midpoint m =

we replace p with m.
In both case, we get a new interval [p, p] whose width decreased by a factor of two. We
started with width N . Thus, in log2 (N ) steps, this size decreases to N/2log2 (N ) = N/N = 1,
i.e., we get the exact location of the inflection point.
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Comment. Other algorithms for detecting inflection points are described, e.g., in [19, 26].
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Chapter 10
Future Work Plans: In Brief
This thesis is devoted to a practically important problem of decision making under uncertainty and its applications to finances and geosciences. In this thesis, we provide our
preliminary results and first applications. We plan to continue this work, both by expanding
our theoretical analysis and by coming up with more examples of practical applications.
In terms of theoretical analysis, what we have done so far is based on deterministic
decision making, when a decision maker consistently selects the same “best” alternative.
In practice, human decision making is often probabilistic: in the same situation, we may
select different alternatives, with different probabilities. This situation has been analyzed
in decision theory by a Nobelist D. McFadden. However, his analysis assumes that we know
the exact gains related to different alternatives. In practice, we usually know the expected
gains only with some uncertainty. So, our main theoretical research direction would be to
extend McFadden’s analysis to the case of decision making under uncertainty.
This planned research is closely related to another related topic that we mentioned
in this thesis: the need to speed up computations. At present, in many problems, deep
machine learning is effectively used to extract dependencies from data. Interestingly, one
of the important stages of deep learning – softmax – uses the exact same formulas as
McFadden’s description of human decision making. As a result, is suffers from the same
limitation as McFadden’s analysis – that it assumed that we know the exact expected
gains of different possible decisions. We hope that extending softmax to a more realistic
case of decision making under uncertainty will help further speed up deep learning-related
computations.
We also plan to work on applications. Just like in this thesis, we plan to both work

59

on explaining the existing phenomena – which would provide a good validity test for our
models – and on producing new recommendations. In terms of explanation, there are
several directions that we plan to pursue:
• First, in addition to seemingly counterintuitive aspects of human behavior that have
been explained in the past and we explain in this thesis, there are other phenomena
that still need explaining. For example, an often cited phrase that giving is better
than receiving definitely reflects some aspects of human behavior, but seems to be
inconsistent with the usual utilitarian models of this behavior.
• Second, the Hurwicz-style analysis of decision making under uncertainty – that we
use in this thesis – explains different types of people’s behavior by assigning, to each
person, a numerical degree of this person’s optimism-pessimism. However, this usual
analysis does not explain why some people are more optimistic and some are more
pessimistic. It is therefore desirable to try to understand this by analyzing which
type of behavior works best in different situations.
• Finally, it is desirable not just to look at the results of human decision making, but
also at procedures that human use to teach their results. For example, as part of
these procedures, humans perform some non-traditional approximate computations.
We plan to analyze how these unusual procedures can be explained in the general
framework of decision making under uncertainty.
Finally, we plan to work on applications:
• First, we plan to analyze how all this can be applied to an area with which we are
all very familiar: grading of student papers. As of now, deciding which problems
and which tests are worth how many points is more of an art. This problem is
difficult to solve in precise terms because clearly we need to make decisions under
uncertainty. We plan to see what recommendations can be extracted if we apply the
general techniques of decision making under uncertainty to this problem.
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• Second, we plan to apply these general techniques to robotics, to see if we can use at
least of these techniques to make robots behavior more human-like and thus, more
acceptable to potential users.
• Finally, we will continue to look for possible challenges and applications in geosciences.
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